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The Blurred Line between Epistemic and Metaphysical Modalities in the Modal 
Epistemology of Imagination 
ABSTRACT 
Modal epistemologies that rely on a fallibilism about modal claims have been gaining traction 
over the years. This paper critically discusses the accounts of Kung (2009; 2010; 2016) and 
Dohrn (2018; 2019; 2020) and argues that they are invariably susceptible to being read as 
entailing claims of epistemic possibility. Both Kung and Dohrn seek to ground modal intuitions 
on non-modal ones, and primarily appeal to the modalizing capacity of imagination to aid in 
the discovery of modal truths. However, insofar as inference from non-modal imagination to 
modal truths remains fallible, then no non-ad hoc distinction can be made between 
substantiation of fallible metaphysically modal claims and infallible epistemically modal ones. 
This is because, barring an agent’s infallible knowledge of modal truths, how these truths are 
asserted must attend the agent’s imperfect epistemic access thereof, therefore entailing claims 
of modality consistent with her epistemic state – i.e., claims of epistemic possibility. If modal 
epistemologies in general non-modally ground their modal assertions in this fallible fashion, 
then they seem inevitably interpretable in terms of epistemic possibility as opposed to some 
non-epistemic reading of metaphysical possibility. 
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This paper looks at the imagination-based modal epistemologies of Kung (2010; 2016) 
and Dohrn (2019; 2020) and argues that these, and other modal epistemologies like them that 
appeal to fallible claims about metaphysical possibility, are invariably susceptible to being read 
as entailing claims of epistemic possibility. Sections 1 and 2 introduce pertinent concepts about 
modality, imagination, and modal epistemology before applying them in Sections 3 to 5 for the 
sake of this paper’s abovementioned argument. 
1. Epistemic and Logical Possibility 
 Dohrn (2018) provides a general definition of epistemic possibility, in that P “is 
epistemically possible relative to some subject S just in case [P] is compatible with S’s 
knowledge.” (373) Epistemic possibility is therefore agent-indexed, but it can also have 
multiple interpretations depending on how we interpret certain epistemic features. Whether, 
for instance, we appeal to what we know for certain or what we know fallibly will dissimilarly 
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impact the meaning of our epistemically modal claims: construing epistemic possibility in 
terms of what we know for certain (call it ♢E(C)) implies stronger modal restrictions than a 
construal in terms of what we fallibly know (call it ♢E(NC)). Yablo (1993) characterizes ♢E(C)P 
as, P is epistemically possible for me just in case P is not contradicted “by my immediate 
evidential situation [e.g. experience or logical knowledge]” (25n52), wherein what is 
immediately evidential for me constitutes my infallible modal knowledge. Yablo’s other 
characterization is of ♢E(NC)P, whereby P is epistemically possible even in the presence of a 
contradiction just in case P is expressed in some closest possible world wherein a contradiction 
is not immediately present (25n52). Here, the evidential situation presenting a contradiction to 
me constitutes my fallible modal knowledge. According to ♢E(NC), apparent contradictions and 
claims of possibility are not at odds with one another since these contradictions are always 
potentially dissolvable given further investigation.1 Lastly, ♢E(C)P makes a stronger claim than 
♢E(NC)P because the presence of a contradiction necessarily rules out the former, but not 
necessarily the latter. 
 This relationship between ♢E(C) and ♢E(NC), regarding their interpretations in terms of 
awareness of apparent contradictions, clarifies a useful distinction between epistemic 
possibility in general and logical possibility. First, to set things up, it is helpful to think of 
logical possibilities as characteristic attributions to the truth values of formulas and concepts 
with interpretable non-logical constants. Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri’s (2019) definition of 
logical necessity, that P is logically necessary “just in case the sentence ‘[P]’ is true under all 
interpretations of its non-logical constants” (1158), gives us an initial way forward concerning 
logical possibility:  
(♢LP) P is logically possible just in case the sentence ‘P’ is true under at least one interpretation 
of its non-logical constants.  
The link between interpreting non-logical constants and the appearance of contradictions is 
thus: if a contradiction presents itself in interpreting a sentence ‘P’, thereby rendering P false 
 
1 Note how the ‘dissolution given further interpretation’ condition is ostensibly not identical to Yablo’s 
‘dissolution in a closest possible world’. However, we will use these conditions interchangeably throughout the 
paper, given that the potential for further interpretation is, in this case, an interpretation in a possible world, and 
vice versa. Why we can use these interchangeably is because whatever interpretation is present in a possible world 
obtains in a world that could be our own. 
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under that interpretation, then ♢LP is false unless further interpretations dissolve the 
contradiction, in which case ♢LP becomes true. For example, according to Strohminger and 
Yli-Vakkuri (2019), “it is logically possible that something is Greek and not Hellenic but not 
logically possible that something is Greek and not Greek, because ‘Greek’ and ‘Hellenic’ are 
[not necessarily identical] non-logical constants.” (1158)  
 There is potential issue, however, with ♢LP’s insensitivity to fallibility or infallibility 
in logically modal claims, since whether something may be logically possible or is logically 
possible is an important distinction. For example, the claim, ‘something is Greek and not 
Hellenic’, may be logically possible just in case there is yet to be an interpretation that renders 
‘Greek’ and ‘Hellenic’ non-identical, whereas the claim is logically possible if there is such an 
interpretation. The relevant definitions are: 
(♢L(C)P) P is logically possible iff there is an interpretation of the non-logical constants of the 
sentence ‘P’ that renders it true. 
(♢L(NC)P) P may be logically possible iff there is yet to be an interpretation of the non-logical 
constants of the sentence ‘P’ that renders it true.  
Notice that ♢L(C)P is different from ♢LP by the replacement of ‘just in case’ with ‘iff’. This 
replacement is significant because it would seem that ‘iff’ is more restrictive than ‘just in case’: 
for ♢L(C)P to be true there must already be a consistent interpretation at hand, while ♢LP attains 
no such restriction. Moreover, ‘iff there is yet to be’ is also more restrictive than ‘just in case 
there is’ since ♢L(NC)P’s truth requires there to currently be no consistent interpretation while 
that of ♢LP simply requires one that may or may not exist. Understand therefore that ♢L(C)P 
and ♢L(NC)P correspond respectively to an infallible and fallible interpretation of ♢LP, since if 
P is claimed to be logically possible, then under ♢L(C)P it cannot be false, but under ♢L(NC)P it 
can be false – under ♢LP, it is vague whether the claim is an infallible or fallible one. 
 All this precisification may seem overly pedantic, but it is important for analyzing 
statements like that of Priest (2016), wherein “[s]ome things that are epistemically possible 
would seem to be logically impossible.” (2652) Here, that P is epistemically possible and would 
seem to be logically impossible is a P that is epistemically possible and possibly logically 
impossible. In other words, the interpretation of the non-logical constants in P has only led to 
apparent contradictions, but that it is not impossible for these to dissolve via further 
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interpretation entails that ♢E(NC)P, not ♢E(C)P, applies in this case. Furthermore, the fact that P 
may turn out to be logically impossible implies that further interpretations may render false the 
claim of impossibility. In short, statements like those of Priest make use of fallible modal 
claims, signaling a motivation for a fallible/infallible interpretation of ♢LP.2  
This sentiment even applies if P is a complex tautology, whose falsity would normally 
be considered logically impossible, since “[f]or all we knew before carrying out the 
computation” of “its long truth table, … [P’s] being false was a way things could be.” (Berto 
and Schoonen, 2018, 2704n8) Here, ♢E(C)(¬P) is true for anyone who had not finished 
computing the truth table, given that no contradiction would be apparent at that time.3 
Additionally, it could be true that ♢L(NC)(¬P), but not ♢L(C)(¬P), for someone, since, before the 
computation of the truth table, there may yet be in their view an interpretation of ¬P’s non-
logical constants that renders ¬P true – the fact that there is presently at that time no such 
interpretation renders ♢L(C)(¬P)’s truth value undecided. This would be a case wherein it is 
questionable whether ¬P is contradictory. Obviously then, for someone who does complete the 
truth table of the tautologous P, for all interpretations of its non-logical constants, ♢L(NC)(¬P) 
would be false. 
What is consequently noteworthy from the above discussion is that ♢L(NC)P seems 
blatantly agent-indexed, for ‘may’ in its definition is epistemic in character. The fact that S can 
claim ♢L(NC)P expresses the epistemic possibility of there yet being for S an interpretation of 
the non-logical constants of the sentence ‘P’ that renders it true, whether there were only 
contradictory interpretations thus far or if no interpretations are currently present at all. 
However, an agent-indexed interpretation of ♢L(C)P is not necessary, simply because its truth 
 
2 Angere (2017) further motivates this interpretation by considering that “mathematical concepts, like all informal 
concepts, are in general not crystallised, definite, or exact. Even when explicitly defined they tend to rest on other 
concepts in which vagueness or indeterminacy remains.” (93) Due to potential vagueness and indeterminacy in 
the interpretation of these concepts, there should thus be an effort to distinguish the attribution of modal claims to 
concepts that have been precisely clarified from a similar attribution to those that have not. (Angere applies this 
idea to a discussion of the differences between “pre-formal” and formal definitions of concepts like circle and 
square (90).) This is precisely what is accomplished in differentiating ♢L(C)P from ♢L(NC)P. 
3 Even obvious contradictions, such as A = ¬A, may be epistemically possible for someone in the sense of ♢E(NC)(A 
= ¬A), since it may not be necessarily impossible for that contradiction to be dissolvable in some closest possible 
world that falsifies the law of noncontradiction. 
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value can be undecided when making this infallible modal claim, given a lack of awareness of 
an extant interpretation. The same cannot be said for ♢L(NC)P, for it necessarily cannot be 
undecided in its truth value: if there is an interpretation that renders P true and is not known by 
S, then that situation already validates ♢L(NC)P for S, because for all that S knows, for certain 
or otherwise, there may yet be an interpretation that renders P true. From this it should be 
obvious that ♢L(NC)P merely expresses the epistemic possibility, in terms of ♢E(C) or ♢E(NC), of 
♢L(C)P being true: ♢L(NC)P = (♢E(C) ∨ ♢E(NC))♢L(C)P. 
With this adumbration of and motivation for the use of terms such as ♢L(NC)P, ♢L(C)P, 
♢E(NC)P, and ♢E(C)P in place, the rest of this paper argues that any claim employing a 
metaphysical modality inevitably falls under the same scheme of characterization: fallible 
claims of metaphysical modality – ♢M(NC) for possibility and □M(NC) for necessity – can always 
be described in terms of epistemic possibility, such that ♢M(NC)P = (♢E(C) ∨ ♢E(NC))♢M(C)P and 
□M(NC)P = (♢E(C) ∨ ♢E(NC))□M(C)P.4 (To save space, we will be writing (♢E(C) ∨ ♢E(NC)) as (♢E) 
unless we make explicit what type of epistemic possibility we are using.) Considering that a 
fallible metaphysical modality is a central feature in many contemporary modal 
epistemologies,5 the argument of this paper should have significant ramifications for the 
contemporary academic view of modal epistemology in general. 
 
4 This interpretation can be motivated somewhat from examples in the literature. For instance, in Berto’s (2017) 
possible-worlds approach to the modal epistemology of imagination, he distinguishes between the agent-indexed 
quantificational feature of the imagination operator and the non-agent-indexed truth conditions for that operator 
(1279-81). Agent-indexed quantification is quantification over the possible worlds that satisfy some subjectively 
determined similarity metric between possible worlds and the real world (Cf., Note 39), while non-agent-indexed 
truth conditions are objective features of these possible worlds’ truth-determining relation to the imagination 
operator’s modalizing inference (Berto, 2017, §4; 2018a, §3). The inference from imagination to metaphysical 
possibility is therefore fallible, as what counts as a validating set of possible worlds for a modal claim is not set 
in stone, meaning that such claims can fail to obtain for whomever is making the claim. Additionally, how one 
determines what counts as a validating world-set for a claim is contingent in part on one’s access of such a world-
set (Berto, 2017, 1279; 2018a, 1878). This access can be couched in terms of ‘epistemic’ access – Berto (2017) 
does consider possible worlds as “epistemic alternative[s] for [the actual one]” (1279) – implying that Berto’s 
account of modality is similarly structured to that of ♢M(NC): whatever metaphysical possibility is true (♢M(C)) can 
only be fallibly ascertained by one’s epistemic capacities (♢E(C) ∨ ♢E(NC)).  
5 Cf., Willaimson, 2007; Kung, 2010; Jago, 2018; Berto, 2018a; Dohrn, 2020. 
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We will explore these ramifications about how we understand where we derive our 
modal knowledge by looking at two popular accounts of the modal epistemology of 
imagination, found in Kung (2010; 2016) and Dohrn (2018; 2019; 2020). This analysis is meant 
to implicate other modal epistemologies that rely on a fallibilism about modal claims, but for 
the sake of space, that extended analysis must be pursued elsewhere. Kung’s account is taken 
up and criticized in Section 3. We then discuss Kung’s faulty use of Kripke’s modal 
epistemology to further clarify where Kung goes wrong (Section 4) before viewing and 
critiquing Dohrn’s account (Section 5.2). We then conclude in Section 6. First, we introduce 
imagination and its relevance to modal epistemology in the following Section. 
2. Imagination and Modal Epistemology 
2.1. Introducing Imagination 
 Imagination is a multifaceted phenomenon,6 attaining both imagistic and semantic 
qualities. Kung (2010) for example describes that imagined images brought to the mind “come 
already categorized; they have conceptual contents already assigned.” (624) Hence, 
imagination should not be identified solely with visual imagery. For instance, Priest (2016) 
considers that one may “conceive of and imagine anything that can be described in terms that 
[they] understand” and that they can bring “before the mind.” (2659) This may involve 
situations ranging from the understanding of “abstract objects” (Berto, 2017, 1278n2) to even 
the mere stipulation of terms and labels ascribed to an imagined scenario (Kung, 2016).  
There is also interplay between what is imagined and the content of what an imaginer 
understands about her imagined scenario. This has led Stuart (2019) to distinguish between two 
imaginative processes, one that is somewhat constrained by our prior experiences of the world, 
call it ‘IC’, “whereby we effortlessly conjure [up a] mental image” in response to apprehended 
meaning (9), and another, more unconstrained process that arbitrarily manipulates this image 
through a relatively free association with our understanding (12), call it ‘IUC’. This distinction 
flexibly ascribes different instances to each process, in that through experience, conditioning, 
and conscious effort, what is produced from IC and IUC could differ between different imaginers 
(13). As an initial approximation, we may view IC as more constrained than IUC by their 
intelligible conceptual content, whereby what is imagined through IC is not as psychologically 
 
6 I use ‘imagine’ and ‘conceive’ interchangeably throughout the paper. Nothing much turns on the word choice, 
except in cases wherein specific accounts of imagination/conception-based modal epistemology are given. When 
specific accounts are dealt with, their own particular wording will be applied for the sake of authenticity. 
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free, as with IUC, to mean just about anything by an imaginer. This distinction between IUC and 
IC is also somewhat mirrored and explicated further in Kung’s (2010) account of, respectively, 
stipulative and non-stipulative imagination. In any case, a link between an imagined scenario 
and an imaginer’s understanding thereof is discussed more fully in Section 3, where we start 
to detail out imagination’s modalizing function and how a distinction between stipulative and 
non-stipulative imagination helps make sense of it. However, first, we can at least introduce 
imagination’s relation with modal knowledge. 
2.2. Hanson’s Account of Modal Epistemology 
 A possible early attempt to diversify imagination’s modalizing function into 
metaphysical and logical possibility is given by Hanson (1959). There, Hanson considers it 
“the essence of imagining, thinking, and picturing, that we cannot imagine, think, or picture 
what is logically impossible.” (87) If logical impossibility is identified with what is 
contradictory, then the idea that, ‘if it is contradictory then it cannot be imagined’, is espoused 
prevalently in the literature.7 However, “not all impossibilities are plain contradictions”, since 
some may be metaphysical impossibilities (Lam, 2018, 2158). Hanson (1959) points in this 
direction, while discussing the logical impossibility of “X, e.g., a quadrilateral triangle”, by 
questioning whether “the connection between X being impossible and X being unthinkable 
may only be an empirical one”, that the reason for an impossibility’s inconceivability may be 
because “[t]here simply never has been a case of anyone thinking, imagining, picturing the 
logically impossible.” (88) In other words, a quadrilateral triangle being contradictory does not 
entail that whenever one denies its inconceivability, they are also making a contradiction or 
being logically inconsistent (91). Here, X may be contradictory, and therefore logically 
impossible, but that X is conceivable may just be a metaphysically impossible claim. Is 
Hanson’s account sensitive to an infallibilism/fallibilism about modal claims?  
 Note first how this move from logical to metaphysical impossibility is concomitant with 
an agent-centeredness. First, Hanson’s (1959) account of logical impossibility is an objectively 
structural one and “has nothing to do with [the] individual” imaginer (87). Second, the move 
to the non-contradictory denial of impossibilities’ inconceivability relies more on agent-
centered language – e.g., “it is again questionable whether the denial of this [i.e., logical 
impossibility] is logically inconsistent, or simply such that we can form no conception of 
 
7 Cf., Chalmers (2002); Williamson (2007, 163); Ichikawa and Jarvis (2012); Lam (2018, 2158); Jago (2018, 4); 
and, Morato (2019, 826). 
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evidence in support of it.” (91. Italics mine.) If we characterize this as a move from logical to 
metaphysical modality then, in line with our discussion in Section 1, we thus characterize this 
as a move from ¬♢L(C)X to ¬♢M(NC)I(X): a move from the infallible logical impossibility of 
some contradiction (X) to the fallible metaphysical impossibility of imagining (I) that X.8 To 
motivate this interpretation further, remember that ♢L(C) does not require an agent-indexed 
reading, so it should be in line with Hanson’s own conception of objective, structural logical 
impossibility. Moreover, with an inevitable agent-indexing of ♢M(NC) (Cf., Note 12), there 
ought not be significant reason to dissuade applying it to Hanson’s agent-centered approach.9 
Lastly, given Hanson’s evidentialism, it would not make much sense to parse his approach as 
a fallibilism about logically modal claims, i.e., ¬♢L(NC)I(X), since empirical claims do not factor 
into the justification of even fallible a priori logical reasoning.10  
We can also motivate transitioning the impossibility claim of ¬♢M(NC)I(X) to the 
possibility claim of ♢M(NC)I(X) as ♢E♢M(C)I(X): if fallible claims about metaphysical 
impossibility can, as Hanson seems to think, be adjudicated by empirical concerns – e.g., an 
impossibility of conceiving of a contradiction can be revoked by evidence of someone 
conceiving a contradiction – then it is epistemically possible whether a hitherto considered 
impossibility is in fact possible. In short, fallibility goes both ways regarding negation or 
positive assertion. As such, if we accept that  
♢M(NC)I(X) = ♢E♢M(C)I(X)                   (1) 
then we can reasonably interpret Hanson’s notion of potentially non-logically inconsistent 
claims about the empirically adjudicable imagining of logical impossibilities as signaling the 
 
8 ¬♢M(NC)I(X) should be read as the fallible negation of the possibility of I(X), not as the negation of this 
possibility’s fallibility itself. 
9 There may be, though, divergent versions of Hanson’s notion of a lack of evidential support. One would be non-
agent-centered, where the lack stems from the evidence just being inextant. Another version would be agent-
centered, where the lack stems from an agent’s inability to produce such evidence. Nevertheless, evidential 
inexistence may just entail an agent’s inability to produce the evidence, so the non-agent-centered version 
naturally leads to an agent-centered reading anyways. 
10 The distance at which conceivability/imagination-based modal epistemology generally stands from a priori 
readings of modal knowledge is why it often ventures a posteriori for the corroboration of modal claims. Cf., 
Dohrn (2020, 3638); Martínez (2015, 659). 
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mere epistemic possibility of the infallible claim of metaphysical possibility regarding 
imagining infallible logical impossibilities.  
As an approximation, we can accept (1) if we accept a link between empirical evidence 
and epistemic possibility, or, said another way, if we accept a compatibility between such 
evidence and our evidential state. This does not look controversial, for generally evidence 
counts towards our knowledge. This means that, in terms of (1), what we view as infallible 
metaphysical possibility (♢M(C)) is inextricably connected to the evidence we have that is 
compatible with our epistemic state, with all that we know for certain or otherwise (♢E(C) or 
♢E(NC)), about said possibility. However, ♢M(NC)I(X) does not denote ♢M(C)I(X) plus some 
empirical substantiation thereof, only that this empirically substantiating factor counts in favor 
merely towards the epistemic possibility of ♢M(C) – any substantiation of ♢M(C) claims are 
therefore fallible and must be because of infallible substantiation of ♢E(C) or ♢E(NC). Hence, 
fallible claims of metaphysical possibility follow closer to claims of epistemic possibility than 
those of infallible metaphysical possibility. 
Additionally, the above discussion is not meant to imply that imagining an impossibility 
counts as evidence towards that impossibility being possible. The evidence of one’s imagining 
an impossibility counts towards the modal status of the imagination itself, towards the 
epistemic possibility of that imagination’s infallible metaphysical possibility, not what the 
imagination is about; something more must be required as evidence towards the metaphysical 
possibility of what an imagining is about. This could also explain why Hanson only makes the 
inference from impossibility to inconceivability, not from inconceivability to impossibility, 
and also why Saint-Germier (2018) characterizes inconceivability-to-impossibility and 
conceivability-to-possibility inferences as qualified by correspondence with “a previously 
identified model of modal error.” (4812-3) In talking about imagination’s modalizing function, 
what we claim as possible/impossible from our imaginings is always fallible, defeasible via 
alternative considerations of what is possible/impossible.11 
 
11 Importantly, what revisions our existing modal claims incur must themselves be fallible as well, since without 
a priori certainty that no other model will conflict with the one appealed to for the revision, we cannot infallibly 
determine that the revised claim will never be defeated – i.e., infallibly know that its outcome will never be 
contradicted. 
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 Let us take stock. We initially offered justification for reading Hanson’s modal 
epistemology about imagination of logical impossibilities in terms of epistemic possibility of 
the infallible metaphysical possibility of such imagination. We then argued that evidence for 
♢M(NC)I(X) only counts towards the epistemic possibility of ♢M(C)I(X), not to ♢M(C)I(X) itself, 
wherein what would be evidence is someone who can imagine logical impossibilities.12 
However, since Hanson only deals primarily with an impossibility-to-inconceivability 
inference, to extend our analysis to conceivability/inconceivability-to-possibility/impossibility 
inferences to see if we can interpret them in terms of epistemic possibility, we must look 
elsewhere to other modal epistemologies.13 
 
 
12 Of course, once someone does imagine an impossibility, then obviously ♢M(C)I(X) would be true, not just 
♢E♢M(C)I(X). Nonetheless, note the subtlety here: in the inevitably agent-indexed reading of ♢M(NC)I(X) – i.e., a 
non-agent-indexed interpretation, wherein there is evidence that the agent does not apprehend, already entails her 
epistemic state as ignorant of said evidence – any evidence of someone imagining an impossibility can always be 
read in light of epistemic possibility. Without such evidence, we have ♢E♢M(C)I(X), but with such evidence, we 
still have ♢E♢M(C)I(X), but only given non-entailing evidence. With entailing evidence, we now have 
□E(C)♢M(C)I(X), which, from the factivity of infallible knowledge, entails ♢M(C)I(X). In other words, evidence for 
♢M(NC)I(X) solely counts towards the epistemic modality of ♢M(C)I(X), not to ♢M(C)I(X) itself, when the evidence 
is non-entailing, because any evidence that entails ♢M(C)I(X) entails the latter’s non-epistemic truth, while non-
entailing evidence, given the existence of epistemic agents, can only entail a truth of an agent’s epistemic state. 
13 Some consider Chalmers’ (2002) notion of ideal conceivability, whereby whether P is conceivable depends on 
P being logically consistent, as providing the least torturous path to infallible claims of metaphysical possibility. 
Jago (2018) agrees as much but brings up a worry: “[o]ften, we can’t tell whether some set of suppositions are 
[logically] consistent or not. So we can’t tell, on the basis of the experience, whether an act of conceiving that [P] 
is an ideal or a non-ideal act of conceiving.” (4) Here, there is a distinction between what is possible and what we 
know is possible that is captured essentially by fallible modal claims, since infallible ones can forego this 
distinction altogether via a factivity principle. However, in our discussion of Hanson, the fact that imagining a 
logical impossibility may (epistemic) be metaphysically possible was minimally guaranteed even without any 
evidence of the existence of such an imagining – a fallible claim without any evidence is still fallible after all. 
Jago considers this as too problematically straightforward a wholesale analysis of metaphysically modal claims, 
for inferences from non-ideal conceivability to metaphysical possibility that eschew any evidence whatsoever are 
“unreliable.” (Jago, 2018, 4) Still, it is argued in Section 5.1 that any fallible modal epistemology looking towards 
reliable evidential substantiation of its claims will entail either an infallibilism about modal claims or a fallibilism 
that can always be interpreted in terms of epistemic possibility. 
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3. Kung’s Thesis (Outline & Critique) 
3.1. Fallibilism about Modal Claims 
 One prominent approach to an imagination-to-possibility thesis is that of Kung (2010; 
2016), who considers there to be a distinction between the “qualitative” and “stipulative” 
components of “sensory imagination”. (2010, 621) This distinction is commensurate with the 
abovementioned one of an imagined scenario and an imaginer’s understanding thereof, in that 
“[s]ome things we imagine by picturing in our mind’s eye; others we simply stipulate are so in 
the imagined situation (often the stipulations are about the mental picture).” (621) Moreover, 
it is imagination’s qualitative component that grounds its metaphysical modalizing function, 
not its mere stipulative one (622). We will call imagination’s qualitative power, IQ, and its 
stipulative power, IS, and this closely matches the above distinction between, respectively, IC 
and IUC made in Section 2.1. 
However Kung, unlike Hanson, takes it that we can imagine impossible scenarios 
through IS.
14 This is not to say that if P is only imaginable through IS – i.e., only through IS(P), 
which equals [IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] – then P is impossible, just that since IQ(P) provides fallible 
evidence for P’s metaphysical possibility, then it should not necessitate that [IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] 
entails the impossibility of P (Cf., Kung, 2010, 658; 2016, 117-8n31, 118-9n49).15 Since Kung 
is working with fallible claims of metaphysical possibility here, we have, 
IQ(P) → ♢M(NC)P                       (2) 
[IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] ↛ ¬♢M(C)P           (3) 
 
14 For Kung (2010), “I imagine myself receiving the Fields medal for proving Goldbach’s conjecture. . . . It is 
clear that I imagine (and I suggest that you also have imagined)—via stipulation—that I really have proved it.” 
(627) Kung’s insistence that we can imagine the impossible goes against error theorists about imagination, who 
deny this. Cf., Gregory (2004) and Geirsson (2005). Kung is appealing to a sentiment present in Priest (2016), 
whereby seemingly anything, even the impossible, can be imagined if in terms that are understood. I am not 
committing myself to Kung’s thesis here, for my focus is that, regardless if the impossible can or cannot be 
imagined, Kung’s fallibilism opens up the way for an epistemically modal reading. 
15 I am using ¬IQ(P) ∧ IS(P) to describe an instance solely of IS(P), because an instance of IS(P) can allow for [IS(P) 
∧ IQ(P)] when there is not a sole instance of IS(P). 
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For Kung, (2) should not be read in terms of ♢M(C)P, since “when you imagine P [i.e., IQ(P)], 
you might be wrong; for all you know P is impossible.”16 Additionally, Kung’s fallibilism also 
implies that “[t]he lack of evidence for impossibility does not amount to evidence for 
possibility.” (2010, 636) This can be interpreted as (3) ↛ ♢M(NC)P, but Kung seems to also 
want, 
[IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] ↛ ¬♢M(NC)P           (4) 
where (4) ↛ ♢M(NC)P. This is because, for Kung, merely stipulatively imagining that P does not 
provide evidence, infallible or not, for P’s metaphysical modal status in general. Kung (2010) 
asks, “[h]ow can imagining be a guide to possibility if it so easily leads us to false possibility 
judgments?” (632) For Kung, if [IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] obtains, then this “merely reflect[s] our less-
than-ideal epistemic position”, and “how can failing to be in [an ideal] epistemic position be 
evidence for [♢M(NC)P], particularly when we note that total ignorance is one way to fail to be 
in the best epistemic position?” (634) As such, we need “positive” and “independent evidence 
for [♢M(NC)P]”, which can take the form of either IQ(P) and/or non-imaginative evidence (e.g. 
perception) for P.17 
 Note that from [IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)], reflecting our ‘less-than-ideal epistemic position’ 
regarding P, we can only reasonably claim at most the mere epistemic possibility that P. In 
other words, 
[IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] → ♢EP                       (5) 
We can justify this interpretation of Kung by looking at his view regarding the modus tollens 
of (5). For Kung (2010), 
the principal way to account for our inability to imagine some propositions [i.e., ¬IS(P) ∧ 
¬IQ(P)] is in terms of certainty. We are unable to imagine proposition P if we are absolutely 
certain that P is false; conversely, so long as we find P believable, epistemically possible in the 
strongest sense that it is true for all we know for certain, or possibly true for all we know for 
certain, we will be able to imagine P via stipulation or label. I mean “certainty” in the strongest 
 
16 Kung (2010, 658). Similar to Note 8, read ¬♢M(C)P and ¬♢M(NC)P as the infallible and fallible metaphysical 
impossibility of P, not the negation of P’s infallible or fallible possibility, since this would, respectively, allow for 
♢M(NC)P and ♢M(C)P, which are not direct claims of impossibility. 
17 Kung, 2010, 634-5. Gregory (2010) espouses a similar position. 
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psychological sense: to be certain of a proposition is to have absolutely no doubts at all, for 
there to be nothing one is more certain of (629). 
Note that [¬IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] is one way to satisfy the consequent of the modus tollens of (5), 
¬[IS(P) ∧ ¬IQ(P)] = [¬IS(P) ∨ IQ(P)].18 
 Consequently, if we accept (5), then we face an intriguing relation given (4) and (1), 
since then ♢EP ↛ ¬♢M(NC)P = ♢M(NC)P = ♢E♢M(C)P,19 or, 
♢EP ↛ ♢E♢M(C)P                           (6) 
However, if we make the somewhat easy assumption that something (proposition, object, etc.) 
can minimally entail its own possibility (P → ♢M(C)P), then (6) is contradictory and entails 
♢M(NC)P ↛ ♢M(NC)P.20 In effect, (6) appears because, for Kung, fallible claims of metaphysical 
possibility are distinct from those of epistemic possibility, because one way to satisfy the latter 
is by complete ignorance, while Kung wants metaphysical possibility to require stronger 
epistemic justification, such as through IQ. (6) can be falsified in two ways: one, as I argue, is 
that the constraint of ‘stronger justification’ still allows for interpretation in terms of epistemic 
possibility, wherein (1) is favored at the expense of (4); two, as Kung argues, is that (4) is 
favored at the expense of (1). Let us see how Kung tries to argue against my position. 
 
18 From the above quote, it may be argued that Kung’s preferred sense of epistemic possibility is ♢E(C), however, 
a reading in terms of ♢E(NC) can be motivated. For instance, Kung (2010) claims that “[i]t is not true for all you 
know that water is not H2O, since, presumably, you do know that water is H2O.” (629n14) Perhaps, but this may 
be the case only in ♢E(NC) since, for ♢E(C), it seems reasonable that it is at least possibly true for all you know for 
certain that water is not H2O, as, presumably, you do not infallibly know that water is H2O. (Invoking ♢E(C) may 
be one way to respond to Weatherson (2004) and Yablo (2002) when they claim that it is difficult to imagine the 
negation of certain conceptual relations – e.g., that water is H2O]. If this is taken to therefore mean that ¬♢(not-
H2O-water), then we can remark that, instead, ♢E(C)(not-H2O-water) since we do not infallibly know that water is 
H2O.)  
19 Recall in Section 1, from the discussion of Hanson’s work, that ¬♢M(NC)I(X) entails ♢M(NC)I(X). Moreover, 
throughout the rest of this paper, we recast (1) by replacing I(X) with the more general P. 
20 This may not work for (♢L(C)P ∧ ¬♢M(C)P) – e.g., Greek ≠ Hellenic, or water ≠ H2O. Now, the literature on what 
counts as metaphysical necessities, as opposed to mere logical necessities, is complex, but see Larrauri Pertierra 
(2021) for an argument on closing the gap between logical and metaphysical modality vis-à-vis a posteriori 
necessities. In any case, it should suffice for our purposes here that, at least for metaphysically charged 
propositions, the derivation of ♢M(NC)P ↛ ♢M(NC)P from (6) attains some legitimacy. 
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3.2. The Problem of Modality’s Fallible Non-Modal Grounds 
 Kung (2010) holds the “claim that it is plausible that basic qualitative content provides 
evidence for possibility, and that evidence doesn’t depend on our justification for believing 
anything else.” (637n23) This portrays an anti-skeptical modal epistemology since, for Kung, 
“we know a priori that the actual world is consistent,” (637n22) and is commensurate with his 
eclecticism in substantiating modal claims (634-5). These desired epistemic ties to the external 
world may therefore explain that, according to Kung, mere stipulation (IS ∧ ¬IQ) cannot be 
evidence for metaphysical possibility lest we permit the world to be radically different or 
inconsistent from how it is by stipulating it as such, which is absurd if we have the 
abovementioned a priori knowledge. Nonetheless, how do we know that the world is 
consistent? If infallibly so, then if Kung also argues that modal claims can be fallibly known, 
we are thus faced with the issue of justifying in a non-ad hoc way this distinction between what 
counts as infallible and fallible knowledge. Instead, if Kung’s a priori knowledge of actual 
world consistency is fallible, then less and less should we be confident that one’s imagination 
can in a non-ad hoc way distinguish between metaphysical and mere epistemic possibility. 
Kung does not give a clear answer to the above dilemma, but he does clarify somewhat 
what he means by a priori knowledge. For instance, an a priori knowledge of actual-world 
consistency affords imagination’s evidential substantiation of modal claims – i.e., a 
justification for (2) – insofar as the relation between imagination and such claims is a consistent 
one. What does it mean for this relation to be consistent? Kung (2010) answers via his “modal 
evidence from imagination [MEI]” proposal (639), which links a priori knowledge of 
consistency with what one finds intuitive: 
[MEI] Imagining situation S provides new evidence that P is possible just in case: 
i. The qualitative content Q and the assigned content V (if any) make it intuitive that, in S, P is 
the case. 
ii. Without qualitative content Q, it would not be intuitive that, in S, P (639). 
Additionally, “a proposition P is intuitive on the basis of content A if one feels rationally 
compelled, in virtue of grasping the proposition and its ingredient concepts, to judge that P 
must be true given A.” (639-40) Q and V respectively function through the IQ- and IS-
imagining, of S, that P. To avoid circularity, A ≠ Q, but if so, then A must be some independent 
evidence for ♢M(NC)P. Now, Kung assumes “that intuitions are evidence” for ♢M(NC) in and of 
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themselves (640n24), but given what we now know of A, it seems as if our intuitions’ evidential 
status is grounded in A. Therefore, A ostensibly does most if not all the work in providing 
justification for ♢M(NC)P, since without A, Q would not make it intuitive that, in S, P is the case. 
Kung (2010) gives a further condition for MEI, in that  
iii. . . . [t]he imaginer must be in a position to either  
a) provide evidence that [V] is possible via some other source; or 
b) provide evidence that [V] is possible in accordance with MEI—that is, imagine a [V] 
verifying situation without merely assigning [V] (this is the recursive step) (642). 
iii(a) can be fulfilled if A acts as independent evidence for ♢M(NC)V through V seeming 
intuitively the case given A, much in the same way that P becomes intuitive on the basis of A. 
iii(b) is meant to address the situation where A cannot act as independent non-imaginative 
evidence. In this case, A’s relation to V is the same as A’s relation to P: A acts, through IQ(A), 
to make intuitive V and P – and since V and P are different, the qualitative contents connected 
to both are not identical – but if A cannot be qualitative content or independent evidence for 
♢M(NC)P or ♢M(NC)V, then A must still stand in some relation to this content justifying the modal 
status of P or V.  
Following Kung (2010), we can analyze this relation as one wherein A constitutes our 
non-modal intuitions about P or V, interpreted generally through instances of IQ(P) or IQ(V), 
which give rise to our metaphysically modal intuitions about them (§6.4). This looks to be a 
correct interpretation as, according to Kung, P and V become intuitive on the basis of A. 
Nonetheless, how can non-modal intuitions be constituted, especially about scenarios radically 
different from what we usually experience? “Frequently, [says Kung,] this will involve 
imagining the origin of” what we have our non-modal intuitions about to manifest a story 
justifying our modal intuitions thereof (2010, 652). Still, non-modal intuitions differ between 
people – I for example cannot intuit for certain that water is or is not H2O – so how one’s 
imagining P’s origin can make P intuitive varies wildly depending on who is imagining what. 
This is not to say that imagination cannot act as evidence for metaphysical possibility, just that 
the evidential relation between imagination and such possibility must be ad hoc. Said another 
way, the critique is as follows: if the relation between our non-modal and metaphysically modal 
intuitions is ad hoc, then how can there be any non-ad hoc way of distinguishing between our 
non-modal, evidential substantiation of metaphysically modal claims and that of epistemically 
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modal claims? If there is no such principled distinction, then formula (1) may indeed be the 
case to the detriment of Kung. How does Kung respond? 
3.3. Appeals to Actuality versus Appeals to Possibility 
Certainly, the opposite approach, that of “reading our prior modal convictions into 
imagination,” is problematic for Kung, who instead wants to use “imagination to help us 
discover modal conclusions.” (Kung, 2016, 97) Nevertheless, a Kungian imagination may be 
susceptible to Tahko’s (2012) and Dohrn’s (2020) criticisms of the counterfactual account of 
modal epistemology, in that its use of imagination to discover modal facts is not itself modally 
innocent and is therefore circular. This criticism obviously does not apply to IS, though, since 
that is modally unrestricted, but it does apply to Kung’s IQ insofar as he believes that certain 
situations are IQ-unimaginable because they are metaphysically impossible. Is this the case? 
According to Kung (2016), 
though we realize (let us suppose) that [unicorns and a counterexample to Goldbach’s 
conjecture (GC)] are impossible, imagining them continues to make them seem possible, just 
like it still appears that the lines in Müller-Lyer illusion are different lengths even when we 
know them to be the same. [This is because] we have been given no independent reason to think 
that the appearance of possibility is sculpted to fit our beliefs about the modal facts—i.e., we 
have been given no reason to think the GC case isn’t an illusion of possibility (106). 
Here, Kung uses the non-modality of measuring Müller-Lyer lines as independent evidence for 
their modal status.  
Still, Kung’s comparison of the modal status of unicorns and a counterexample to GC 
to that of the Müller-Lyer lines being of different lengths is suspect. First, his use of the unicorn 
case as an example of a metaphysical impossibility is contentious,21 but let us assume for now 
that someone could IQ-imagine a unicorn, which ought to dispel the unicorn case’s mere 
‘illusion of possibility’. If Kung continues to deny this, then he would be imposing his own 
 
21 Kung supposedly does not want to regard unicorns as metaphysically possible because there is yet to be evidence 
for someone’s imagining a convincing origin story for unicorns. However, if we assume a non-modal basing of 
our modal intuitions, then it is still unclear how this basing relation ought to be understood. As will be clarified 
in Section 5.2, one possibility, that of basing our modal intuitions on their relevant similarity to our other non-
modal intuitions, affords evidence for a unicorn’s origin story through considering similar enough origin stories 
of actual animals. If relevant similarity is couched in terms of degree (Cf., Rasmussen, 2014), then IQ-imagining 
a unicorn should be relatively unproblematic. 
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modal convictions into what is imaginable. However, the GC case is different, for since a 
counterexample to GC “would necessarily be a counterexample” (Kung, 2016, 105), then its 
illusion of possibility is maintained insofar as its identity has yet to be adjudicated. On the other 
hand, for the unicorn case, whatever apparent illusion of possibility is not about logical identity; 
unicorns are not logically impossible, while a counterexample to GC is either logically 
necessary or impossible, yet we do not know which one is the case. Inasmuch as Kung appears 
to be importing the unicorn and GC cases under the broad umbrella of impossibility, then it 
appears that his account of imagination is not modally innocent – it is circular – of his modal 
intuition that these cases’ impossibility is a metaphysical necessity.22  
Kung may respond that a circularity critique can be downplayed because whatever non-
modal intuition he uses to inform his sense of imagination is fallible and thus not completely 
replaceable by an appeal to modal intuitions that inform imagination’s modal inferences – 
Kung’s more general fallibilism, after all, amounts to that, “with belief and knowledge that 
falls short of absolute certainty, we can always imagine being wrong” (2016, 117n29). 
However, despite this, we have yet to discuss a principled way of distinguishing, from our non-
modal imaginings/knowledge of/that P, between evidential substantiation of ♢EP and that of 
♢E♢M(C)P in order to justify (6). If so, then (6) may be false, thereby allowing for (1) at the 
expense of (4) and therefore of Kung’s account, regardless of how he grounds his modal 
intuitions. 
Now, Kung still has a potential response. Given MEI, Kung requires, for (2) to obtain, 
that IQ(P) elicit P as intuitively the case. However, a supposedly weaker version would require 
that IQ(P) elicit P as solely intuitively possible. Maybe this weaker version grants evidence for 
P’s epistemic possibility only, since I can find P’s possibility intuitively the case on much 
weaker non-modal grounds than on what I can find P’s actuality intuitively the case. Indeed, 
MEI’s appeal to the lack of an actual real-world scenario for authentication of modal claims 
should easily allow this. Therefore, we can have a difference between evidential substantiation 
of ♢EP and that of ♢E♢M(C)P based on a non-modal distinction between, respectively, IQ(♢EP) 
 
22 One may be disabused of this appearance, though. Kung elsewhere (2009) does claim that imagining a 
convincing origin story for what is IS-imagined – e.g., a skeptical scenario – can act as authentication of that 
stipulation without appealing to actuality – i.e., an appeal to possibility – and this can occur for a strong-enough 
IQ-imagination about said stipulation (405n31). Consequently, Kung’s use of unicorns and GC cases may just be 
provisional. 
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→ ♢EP and IQ(P) → ♢M(NC)P, which, a fortiori, entails a distinction between IQ(♢EP) → ♢EP 
and IQ(P) → ♢M(C)P. If we then reasonably assume that a proposition entails its own epistemic 
possibility, then ♢M(C)P → ♢E♢M(C)P, and we now have a distinction between ♢EP and 
♢E♢M(C)P based on a corresponding distinction between their evidential substantiations. As 
such, in favor of Kung, while ♢EP and ♢E♢M(C)P may be evidentially distinct on non-modal 
grounds, (6) would still be false, because while ♢EP → ♢E♢M(C)P is true, its converse is not. 
Still, do the abovementioned distinctions speak positively about a distinction between 
♢E♢M(C)P and ♢M(NC)P that saves (4) and thus Kung’s account? If there is one, then presumably 
it would be grounded in a distinction between the non-modal substantiations of these different 
modalities. 
Nevertheless, given Kung’s fallibilism, it seems as if this non-modal distinction is one 
of degree, meaning that there is nothing principledly distinguishing the non-modal grounds that 
elicit our fallible metaphysical modal intuitions from those that elicit our infallible epistemic 
modal intuitions; after all, the non-modal grounds for metaphysical possibility are themselves 
fallibly construed. This occurs when, for example, our non-modal knowledge that water is H2O 
elicits our modal knowledge that it is impossible for ‘water to be XYZ’ (XYZWater).
23 However, 
since this non-modal knowledge is fallible, then it entails a non-modal space in which a putative 
partial origin story for XYZWater can make it intuitively possible, which thus elicits modal 
knowledge that ♢E(XYZWater). (This extra non-modal space characterizes the blurred 
distinction between the two types of non-modal grounds in terms of the fallible non-modal 
knowledge and its entailed space.) The issue is, the same non-modal grounds that elicit 
♢E(XYZWater) for someone (S1) might, for someone else (S2), make it intuitively the case that 
XYZWater even with some minimal IQ(XYZWater), thereby eliciting ♢M(NC)(XYZWater) for S2. 
This latter concern would be at the expense of a principled distinction now between epistemic 
and metaphysical possibility in modal, not non-modal, terms due to differences in S1’s and S2’s 
non-modal intuitions. (This extra non-modal space characterizes the blurred distinction 
between the two types of modality in terms of their grounding on the same non-modal space; 
the extent of the blurriness depends on the size of this space – i.e. how convincing fallible non-
modal intuitions generally are, in that, the more unconvincing they are, the less the modal 
 
23 Cf., Kung (2010, 652). For Cameron (2009) this non-modal knowledge is constituted by empirical and analytic 
considerations regarding water as H2O. 
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distinction is blurred and the less this non-modal space is shared between both types of modal 
intuition.) 
Let us take stock. Kung desires for his modal fallibilism a favorable grounding of 
fallible modal intuitions on fallible non-modal ones to justify something like (4) at the expense 
of (1), which would dissolve the contradiction inherent in (6). This is accomplished supposedly 
through MEI, wherein attainment of, say, IQ(P), and therefore ♢M(NC)P, comes through the 
authentication of IS(P) via two potential means, an appeal to possibility (e.g., further IQ-
imagination) or to actuality (e.g., experience and observation) in non-modal space. This dual 
appeal to possibility or actuality can respectively differentiate between ♢EP and that of 
♢E♢M(C)P, but to save Kung’s account, it needs to also distinguish between ♢E♢M(C)P and 
♢M(NC)P. However, the importation of a fallibilism into non-modal grounds, for avoiding a 
circularity charge wherein Kung’s non-modal convictions betray an underlying modal intuition 
vis-à-vis necessity, is problematic. One, a non-modal fallibility affords the sharing of some 
extra non-modal space between the infallible epistemic modalities (♢E♢M(C)P) and fallible 
metaphysical modalities (♢M(NC)P) that are based on it. Two, this sharing of non-modal space 
therefore speaks against a principled distinction between ♢E♢M(C)P and ♢M(NC)P, consequently 
corroborating (1) at the expense of Kung’s account.24 
 Our discussion of Hanson (1959) was meant to show how impossibility-to-
inconceivability inferences are fraught with concerns about how ‘impossibility’ ought to be 
construed, since whether ‘impossibility’ is open to interpretation in terms of mere epistemic 
possibility depends on impossibility claims being seen as fallible. If impossibility-to-
inconceivability inferences are instances of more general modal-to-non-modal inferences (M-
NM inferences), then Kung’s account (2010; 2016) can be seen as a discussion on the feasibility 
of non-modal-to-modal inferences (NM-M inferences). Although NM-M inferences may be 
more desirable than M-NM ones, at least for Kung, fallibilism about non-modal grounds does 
not preclude interpretability in terms of mere epistemic possibility. Are fallible M-NM and 
NM-M inferences just doomed to this inevitable epistemic construal thereof? To appreciate 
this notion more, let us diverge for a moment and consider how infallible accounts of M-
NM/NM-M inferences are constructed. We will not be running the gamut on such accounts, 
 
24 This analysis should also apply to accounts of metaphysical necessity, such that □M(NC)P = ♢E□M(C)P, given that 
what justifies the importation of the term, ♢E, is a general fallibilism about modality, not just possibility. 
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but instead will focus on Kripke’s notion of imagination’s modalizing properties as a way 
forward. 
4. A Kripkean Detour 
The Error Theory of imagination’s modal character is a way to interpret Kripke as 
espousing an account of infallible M-NM inferences. This theory has four main ramifications: 
either A) what is impossible we cannot imagine, B) what we believe to be impossible we cannot 
imagine, C) what is impossible we can imagine, or D) what we believe to be impossible we 
can imagine (Cf. Kung, 2016, 91-93). Kung takes Kripke’s Error Theory to be leaning towards 
A (94). A passage from Kripke’s work ostensibly supports this: 
We can imagine having discovered that [this table] wasn’t composed of molecules. But once 
we know that this is a thing composed of molecules—that this is the very nature of the substance 
of which it is made—we can’t then, at least if the way I see it is correct, imagine that this thing 
might have failed to have been composed of molecules (Kripke 1980, 127).  
How do we come to know of metaphysical necessities then? Kripke gives us a hint in the 
following quotes: 
This table itself could not have had an origin different from the one it in fact had, but in a 
situation qualitatively identical to this one with respect to all the evidence I had in advance, the 
room could have contained a table made of ice in place of this one (Kripke 1980, 142). 
Any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori, could not have turned out otherwise. In 
the case of some necessary a posteriori truths, however, we can say that under appropriate 
qualitatively identical evidential situations, an appropriate corresponding qualitative statement 
might have been false. The loose and inaccurate statement that gold might have turned out to 
be a compound should be replaced (roughly) by the statement that it is logically possible that 
there should have been a compound with all the properties originally known to hold of gold 
(Kripke 1980, 142-3). 
If I say, “Gold might turn out not to be an element,” I speak correctly; “might” here is epistemic 
and expresses the fact that the evidence does not justify a priori (Cartesian) certainty that gold 
is an element. I am also strictly correct when I say that the elementhood of gold was discovered 
a posteriori. If I say, “Gold might have turned out not to be an element,” I seem to mean this 
metaphysically and my statement is subject to the correction noted in the text (Kripke 1980, 
143n). 
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As such, for Kripke, our knowledge of metaphysical necessities is based on our apprehension 
of identity principles, wherein “identity is not a relation which can hold contingently between 
objects.” (Kripke 1980, 154) This also means that Kripke’s Error Theory can be interpreted in 
an NM-M inferential fashion, since identity is presumably a non-modal feature. What is 
important here is not whether Kripke espouses either NM-M or M-NM inferences, but what 
his infallibilism allows us to conclude.  
 Interestingly enough, the above passages may also be interpreted in favor of either B, 
C, or D. How so? For one, there is an interplay between different modalities – epistemic, 
logical, and metaphysical. For Kripke (1980), if identity is real, then it is logically necessary, 
yet certain identifications may be logically contingent but necessary in other modalities (150-
5). Metaphysically necessary identities, such as gold being an element (GasE), are not 
epistemically necessary, so it is epistemically possible for gold to be a molecule (GasC) since 
there is no a priori certainty that the opposite is true. This is the case when Kripke claims that 
‘Gold might turn out not to be an element’. Call it, ♢E(C)(GasC). Furthermore, it is also logically 
possible for there to have been some phenomena-equivalent replica of elemental gold (Ph-G) 
that is instead a compound. This is the case when Kripke claims that ‘Gold might have turned 
out not to be an element’. Call it, ♢L(C)[(Ph-G)asC]. Thus, it is possible for gold epistemically 
to be and logically to have turned out to be a compound.  
This latter logically possible scenario admits of an epistemically modal interpretation, 
in that ♢E(C)[(Ph-G)asC]. However, the former epistemically possible scenario does not seem to 
admit of a logically modal reading. This is because, given GasE, and this identity is 
automatically logically necessary, ♢L(C)[(Ph-G)asC] is true but ♢L(C)[GasC] is not: GasC is 
logically impossible, for elements are not compounds. This follows what was said above, that 
some epistemic possibilities can be logical impossibilities. Moreover, Kripke considers both 
modal scenarios epistemically possible, even the one where elemental gold is a compound 
(1980, 124-5), presumably because I need to stipulate first that GasE before showing that 
¬♢L(C)[GasC]; even if GasE is true, if I am ignorant of this, it would be true that ♢E(C)(GasC) for 
me, because it is not a priori certain that GasE.
25 From this we can claim that what is meant by 
 
25 Kung (2016) seems to discount this when he claims that, for Kripke, we do not imagine, even in terms of 
epistemic possibility, a posteriori impossibilities, as Kung appears to conflate the above epistemically modal 
reading with the logically modal reading (93-4), forgetting that we can reasonably interpret Kripke as espousing 
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‘gold’ in both the epistemically and logically possible scenarios are distinct: gold, as an 
element, might (epistemically) turn out not to be an element, while gold, as some phenomenal 
equivalent to elemental gold, might (logically) have turned out not to be an element. The fact 
that both phenomenally equivalent types of gold are epistemically possible means that we 
cannot know for certain which type obtains in the actual world, which metaphysical necessity 
is in fact the case.26 
So, what does the above discussion allow us to conclude concerning the ramifications 
of Kripke’s infallibilism? Principledly, the fact that I need to stipulate GasE before showing 
what contradicts it clarifies a relation between logical and metaphysical modality and 
imagination: while I have to stipulate metaphysical necessities [IS(P) → □M(C)P] for me to 
conclude that imagining their negation entails imagining an impossibility [IS(¬P) → 
¬♢M(C)(¬P)], I do not have to stipulate logical necessities for me to conclude similarly, because 
logical necessities, so to speak, ‘come with the territory’ – e.g. I do not have to stipulate that 
gold is gold for me to conclude that imagining that gold being not gold is an impossibility.27 In 
other words, for logical necessities, I can go straight to IS(¬P) → ¬♢L(C)(¬P) without passing 
first through IS(P) → □L(C)P. The relations may look as such: for metaphysical modality, [IS(P) 
→ □M(C)P] → [IS(¬P) → ¬♢M(C)(¬P)]; for logical modality, □L(C)P → [IS(¬P) → ¬♢L(C)(¬P)].28 
 
an epistemic modality that admits of no logically modal reading. Berto and Schoonen (2018, §5) are similarly 
guilty as well. However, see Kung (2016, 117n24). 
26 This is not the same as saying that we do not know that a metaphysical necessity is not metaphysically necessary, 
for we cannot know this because it is logically impossible; in fact, we know a priori that what is metaphysically 
necessary is metaphysically necessary, just not which of the different possibilities of gold’s metaphysically 
necessary identity obtains in the actual world. 
27 Kung seems to agree, although he does not go so far as to say that imagining the negation of an identity relation 
is impossible, just that it may be extremely difficult, even under IS-imagination. Cf., Kung (2016, 104). Other 
logical rules in various modal logics may not possess the same status – i.e., they may have to be stipulated – but 
it should be a priori impossible, in whatever modal logics, for me to IQ-imagine something as not itself insofar as 
I do imagine that something. The situation however may be different if only IS-imagination takes place, for then 
presumably I would not be IQ-imagining that something. 
28 Interestingly, we can see how Kripke is espousing an account both of NM-M and M-NM inferences: for 
metaphysical modality, ([IS(P) → □M(C)P] → [IS(¬P) → ¬♢M(C)(¬P)]) expresses an NM-M inference since it starts 
with infallibly, non-modally intuiting, via stipulation, an identity; for logical modality, (□L(C)P → [IS(¬P) → 
¬♢L(C)(¬P)]) expresses an M-NM inference since it starts with an infallible modal intuition about logical identity. 
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Note how epistemic possibility plays no part in these constructions, primarily because we have 
avoided modal fallibilism by relying on our stipulations. 
However, does Kripke avoid Kung’s appeal to (2), IQ(P) → ♢M(NC)P? I may IS-imagine 
logical and metaphysical impossibilities, but can I IQ-imagine metaphysical impossibilities 
without inferring fallible modal claims? According to Kripke, yes, but there is a nuance here: 
we cannot IQ-imagine metaphysical impossibilities, but only in imagining that something that 
is is not what it is;29 but this just amounts to me IQ-imagining a stipulated identity as not itself, 
to an instance of IQ(¬P) ∧ [IS(P) → □M(C)P], the latter conjunct entailing ¬♢M(C)(¬P), not 
¬♢M(NC)(¬P), given the stipulation. If I instead want to IQ-imagine a metaphysical impossibility, 
then I can stipulate P as something else, not besides itself – i.e., not in terms of IQ(¬P) ∧ [IS(P) 
→ □M(C)P] – but besides what I had identified it with besides itself – i.e., in terms of IQ(P → 
¬R) ∧ [IS(P → R) → □M(C)(P → R)], the latter conjunct entailing ¬♢M(C)(P → ¬R). In this case 
there would not be IQ(¬P) ∧ [IS(P) → □M(C)P] because I would not have claimed ¬P in the first 
place; I would still be IQ-imagining P as P. Since we have [IS(P → R) → □M(C)(P → R)], we 
can then avoid ¬♢M(NC)(P → ¬R). In either case we can avoid interpretation in terms of 
epistemic possibility through, again, a reliance on stipulation.30 
Anyways, we have just seen how an account of infallible NM-M/M-NM inferences 
avoids an interpretation in terms of epistemic possibility through non-modal stipulation of the 
identities involved. On the other hand, accounts of fallible NM-M inferences, such as Kung’s, 
require more than mere stipulation of what a non-modal construction (e.g., an imagining) is 
about, this being the authentication of the stipulation via an appeal to non-modal considerations 
of actuality or possibility. These considerations function as the fallible, non-entailing evidence 
for modal claims, but this move from non-modality to modality still needs a method of 
specification of the NM-M inference so as to avoid charges of vagueness and incompleteness. 
We have already seen how Kung’s way, found in MEI, fails to speak against an interpretation 
 
29 Cf., Kripke, 1971. Gregory (2004) and Soames (2009) elaborate upon and espouse this interpretation of Kripke 
as well. 
30 Moreover, the fact that we need these stipulations for our IQ-imaginings to make sense metaphysically modally 
corroborates Kripke as espousing all of A to D above, given that we can IQ-imagine metaphysical impossibilities, 
contrasted to Kung (2016, §2), and that we do this given all sorts of stipulations, even those we believe not to be 
the case, such as gold not being an element. What we cannot IQ-imagine though are logical impossibilities. 
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in terms of mere epistemic possibility. One other method, however, may be able to avoid this, 
that of a possible worlds approach. 
5. The Modal Relevance of Possible Worlds and Dohrn’s Thesis 
5.1 The Issue with Modal Relations to the Truth of Possible Worlds as Non-Modal 
Constructions 
 Many conceivability views of modal epistemology see imagining that P as the 
imagination of a world that verifies P in some sense. Yablo (1993) and Chalmers (2002) are 
famous examples of this.31 This verification requirement can be taken in terms of sufficient 
imaginative detail of a constructed world, but what counts as sufficient detail has been 
contentious (Cf., van Inwagen, 1998; Geirsson, 2005). The issue is, if fallible inference to P’s 
metaphysical possibility, from imagination of a P-verifying world [IQ(P-world) → ♢M(NC)(P)], 
is to obtain, then what counts as sufficient imaginative detail of a P-verifying world ostensibly 
can only be made in an ad hoc fashion about the truth of P in that world, the truth of (P-world). 
 We can appropriate, for our purposes, Lam’s notion of “Truth Relating”, wherein “[i]f 
X is the source of epistemic justification for our belief on a subject matter [e.g., what P is 
about], X must be related to the truth on that subject matter in a way that does not have to be 
 
31 For Yablo (1993), “I find p conceivable if I can imagine, not a situation in which I truly believe that p, but one 
of which I truly believe that p.” (26) Chalmers’ account is more complex, but still relevant in terms of a possible-
worlds approach to conceivability. The following is based on an interpretation of Chalmers in Strohminger and 
Yli-Vakkuri (2017, 827-8): P is conceivable iff it is not the case that, for each world w considered as an epistemic 
possibility, ¬P is true in w, now considered as a metaphysical possibility. That is, for inferring P’s metaphysical 
possibility from a conceivable P, we must get from worlds that are merely possible for all we know, where P or 
¬P could obtain, to worlds that are actually possible, where it is not the case that ¬P is true in every such world. 
Cf., Chalmers, 2006; 2012, chaps. 1-4. To get to such metaphysically possible worlds, we would need an ideal 
imagination (Chalmers, 2002, 149-50), while getting merely to epistemically possible worlds would be through 
non-ideal imagination via the use of centered worlds (Chalmers, 2011). I am on board with Chalmers’ method, 
but note that his appeal to ideal imagination to justify claims of metaphysical possibility seems more in line with 
infallibilism than fallibilism, as ideally imagining a world that the agent takes to verify P is tantamount to that 
agent invariably constructing a possible world in which P is true. Insofar as the ideal agent also knows that P is 
true in the imagined world, which is reasonable if what the ideal agent takes as P’s verification entails P’s 
verification, then her claim that P is metaphysically possible cannot fail. Consequently, Chalmers’ NM-M 
inferential account is not open to construal in terms of epistemic possibility due to its ideal agent-dependent 
infallibilism, which is precisely part of the argument being made in this paper since both it and Chalmers’ account 
make use of epistemic necessity. 
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characterized in terms of epistemic justification.”32 In relation to imagination’s modalizing 
function, X would express IQ(P-world) as the epistemic justification of our beliefs about the 
truth value of P-world, which then affords inference to ♢M(NC)(P). Furthermore, not having this 
truth relation be characterized in terms of epistemic justification may avoid an epistemic 
reading of metaphysical modality, since a P-verifying world would ground P’s modal truth in 
non-epistemic terms of the world itself – i.e., it would not be necessary to read ♢M(NC)(P) as 
♢E♢M(C)P if ♢E can be replaced by better precisification of a world.  
However, for Lam, this feature of Truth Relating, of having a non-(epistemic 
possibility) reading of metaphysical modality, would only be the case for infallible modal 
claims, not fallible ones. If Truth Relating is true, then, according to Lam (2018), “to have bad 
[epistemic] justification is to have no justification at all”, and if we understand that bad 
justification can be due to beliefs that are false, then “false beliefs aren’t justified at all. 
Surprisingly, this is infallibilism about epistemic justification” (2171), which is entailed by the 
acceptance of Truth Relating as a necessary condition for epistemic justification (2167). In 
other words, ‘infallibilism about epistemic justification’ of modal claims is entailed when such 
justification is made to relate in any non-circular fashion to the truth of what such claims are 
about. This is because, if these claims are in any way false, then they obviously do not have a 
relation to the truth outside of a circular recasting in terms of our fallible knowledge of this 
truth when its falsity is not certain to us – i.e., for fallible modal claims, it is open whether these 
claims even relate to the truth at all, and any relation we can conjure up must circularly consist 
in an epistemic fallibilism, which Lam wants to avoid. Similarly, since a claim’s falsity is 
possible barring infallible epistemic justification of its truth, any modal system that employs 
less than infallible knowledge of its claims will always be interpretable in terms of epistemic 
possibility. How this is so is because the factivity of knowledge in, say, □E(C)♢M(C)P → ♢M(C)P, 
where □E(C) expresses infallible epistemic justification (infallible knowledge), only works for 
infallible modal claims where ♢M(C)P does not require a reading in terms of epistemic 
possibility. Therefore, anything less than a □E(C)-constraint cannot avoid such a reading. 
In connection to possible worlds, the reason why what counts as sufficient detail for 
instantiating IQ(P-world) → ♢M(NC)(P) can only be made in an ad hoc fashion about the truth 
 
32 Lam, 2018, 2167. The condition of not characterizing X’s relation to the truth of what some P is about in terms 
of epistemic justification is to avoid circularity. 
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of P-world is because any non-ad hoc method would invoke Truth Relating, and thus be 
characterizable as dealing with infallible claims about P-world. To have an ad hoc way of 
viewing a truth-relevant relation from IQ(P-world) to P-world is to have a way for P-world’s 
truth to fail. This is what can be meant by having fallible claims as to what counts as sufficient 
detail for IQ(P-world): because of this ad hoc truth relation, what we may regard as sufficient 
detail may not actually be sufficient. If we then construct our fallible modal claims in this 
fashion, then the reason why NM-M inferences about P are fallible is because what we can 
veridically infer about P-world from details of IQ(P-world) is fallible as well. Truth Relating is 
thus avoided in a fallibilism about IQ(P-world), but this just permits the truth-relevant relation 
between IQ(P-world) and P-world being couched in terms of a fallible knowledge of P-world’s 
truth, which does not really do much to avoid construing ♢M(NC)P as ♢E♢M(C)P. Can a possible 
worlds approach to imagination’s modalizing functionality still avoid this while rescuing a 
useful relation to modal truth that is not infallibly constituted nor wholly inaccurate? To assess 
a potential response, we now turn to the modal epistemology of Dohrn (2018; 2019; 2020). 
5.2. Dohrn’s Thesis (Outline and Critique) 
 Dohrn (2019) describes a “properly constrained role of imagining or conceiving” that 
P, wherein sufficiency in IQ(P-world) is neither infallibly regarded nor so modally unrestricted 
as to be inaccurate (2465).33 Dohrn’s account begins by employing Yablo’s (1993, 28) 
distinction between imagining a world as determinate (specifying that it possesses some 
determinate thing/feature) from imagining it determinately (specifying what it possesses that 
is determinate).34 Then, Dohrn (2019) considers the following:  
Let our reasoning from a being F and G to b being F and possibly G proceed via imagining b 
being F and G. Uncertainties about the details of b being G are overcome by imagining the 
circumstances of b as determinate in largely the same way as in the case of a (2468).  
 
33 Dohrn, like Kung, wants imagination to afford us accurate inferences to metaphysical modality, so he avoids 
claiming, as imagination’s sole modalizing function, “that imagination that p provides justification that p is 
possible unless there is a salient defeater.” (Dohrn, 2019, 2465) Relying only on salient defeaters as a tool for 
evaluating modal claims means that even the most impoverished imaginings of P can act as justification for P’s 
metaphysical possibility, as long as salient defeaters are not being apprehended. 
34 Dohrn (2019) argues that Yablo’s application of this distinction in his way of formulating modally relevant 
conceivability is ad hoc since it allows for one to “simply disregard any neuralgic detail as determinate” without 
relevantly specifying it (2466). Nonetheless, Dohrn follows Yablo in spirit here, albeit not in detail. 
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Here, IQ-imagining b as G, IQ(basG), guides us to ♢M(NC)(basG). Following Kung, this implies 
that basing claims of possibility does not have to be restricted to claims of actuality;35 this is 
motivated for Dohrn in the following way: claiming that ♢M(NC)(basG) can be based on 
imagination if a detail, imagined as determinate in whatever b is claimed as possible, has a 
relevantly similar counterpart, imagined determinately in some imagined a, wherein IQ(aasG) 
→ ♢M(C)(aasG) is an uncontroversial inference. For Dohrn, “one imagines a series of scenarios 
connected by overall similarity, starting with modally perfectly uncontroversial ones, until one 
reaches the intended one. From some point onwards, one will have to imagine merely possible 
scenarios.”36 These modally uncontroversial scenarios are ones wherein details are imagined 
determinately, and by some similarity measure we then derive modal claims for relevantly 
similar scenarios that can be imagined as determinate for those details relevantly similar to 
ones in modally uncontroversial scenario.37 
 Dohrn (2019) clarifies further, in that, 
a representation of a world is suitably concrete and consistent precisely if firstly, the [IQ-
imagination] of details is consistent; secondly, any detail that is [IS-imagined] can be regarded 
as determinate, … [which occurs] precisely if some [world] as imagined seems sufficiently 
similar to the actual world. The background assumption is that impossible worlds do not seem 
sufficiently similar to the actual one (2471). 
What we regard as the metaphysically impossible worlds is thus dependent on our sense of 
those worlds’ relevant similarity to our own: “[w]e have to specify our [IQ-imagination] of a 
[world] until we feel that the rest can be regarded as determinate [via IS-imagination] as it 
seems sufficiently similar to the actual world.” (2472) In this way, we do not have to commence 
our modal reasoning from the actual world insofar as our IQ-imagination of a possible world 
allows us to confidently “assess relevant similarities and dissimilarities” to the actual world in 
a detail-sufficient, yet defeasible manner (2474).38 Dohrn espouses a modal fallibilism similar 
 
35 Roca-Royes (2017), for example, employs such a restriction. 
36 Dohrn, 2019, 2469. It may be easier to see [IQ(a is G) → ♢M(C)(a is G)] as being about an initial uncontroversial 
scenario if IQ(a is G) is conducted by an ideal agent. See Note 31. 
37 I take it that what minimally counts as relevantly similar details is when these details are situated in possible 
worlds that differ only in degree. Cf., Rasmussen, 2014. 
38 Dohrn’s fallibilism about a similarity metric for a possible-worlds framework vis-à-vis modal claims extends 
to the claims themselves, such that metaphysically modal claims that rely on near-enough possible worlds not 
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to Kung’s because the line that separates worlds that are relevantly similar, to factor into 
reliable modal reasoning, from worlds that are not is ultimately a subjective enterprise (2473).39 
Therefore, we can consider a scenario as metaphysically possible at least if our IQ-imagination 
of a world verifying that scenario does not posit any feature of that world as categorically 
distinct from the actual world – i.e., if it is not inconsistent with our world.  
However, this is just to say that any relevantly similar world to the actual one ought to 
not contradict our actual one; but at what point in our development of IQ(P-world) do we say 
that sufficient non-contradictory detail has been so imagined about a P-world for it to count as 
relevantly similar to ours? After all, there does not seem to be anything principledly preventing 
one from coming up against a contradiction at some point past where they had already 
consistently imagined thus far.40 Dohrn’s fallibilism may explain why he offers no convincing 
answer for how a future contradiction in one’s IQ(P-world) can be avoided, but it is not ruled 
out that any further iteration of a currently non-contradicting IQ(P-world) will never come 
across some contradiction; after all, just because claims are fallible does not necessitate their 
falsity. However, the issue is that if there is no non-ad hoc way of determining whether one’s 
claim of ♢M(NC)P will or will not be defeated given some subsequent IQ(P-world), then, apart 
from espousing a modal epistemological infallibilism that would require a fully comprehensive 
IQ(P-world), there would be no non-ad hoc way of distinguishing ♢E♢M(C)P from ♢M(NC)P. This 
is because, given no apparent contradiction, any true ♢M(C)P would invariably be interpretable 
as ♢E♢M(C)P from the perspective of one claiming ♢M(NC)P, and any apparent contradiction 
would just invoke the infallible inference, [IQ(P-world) → ⊥] → ♢E(NC)♢M(C)P, which is still an 
epistemic reading.41 
Dohrn elsewhere seeks to make our awareness of any relevant coherence/incoherence 
for validating [IQ(P-world) → ♢M(NC)P] more robust and less ad hoc. In analyzing imagination’s 
utility in counterfactual reasoning, Dohrn (2020) remarks that  
 
invalidating said claim can fail given divergent considerations on what counts as a near-enough possible world. 
Dohrn elsewhere applies a similar analysis to the modal status of Gettier cases. Cf., Dohrn, 2018, 367. 
39 Berto (2018b, 5) also opts, in his logic of imagination, for a similarly subjective metric determining accessibility 
relations between our world and possible worlds.  
40 Cf., Notes 2 and 3. 
41 The details of how an apparent contradiction is recognized is discussed in our analysis of Kripke in Section 4. 
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addressing a modal issue whether [♢M(NC)P is true] triggers an exercise of imaginatively 
developing a counterfactual supposition that [P]; that supposition does not have to be explicit. 
The development draws on any relevant knowledge. The relevant knowledge must largely 
inform our immediate dispositions to import certain facts into the imagined scenario. When 
they are imported into an impossible [P]-scenario, the scenario becomes incoherent. Becoming 
aware of this incoherence, we answer the possibility question in the negative. In contrast, if 
sufficient development does not lead to incoherence, we give a positive answer (3645).  
The robustness of this incoherence for the impossibility case persists when it “cannot be 
remedied by weakening the conflicting constraints” between our counterfactual supposition 
that P and a recognized contradiction (3646). If we interpret the imaginative development of a 
counterfactual supposition that P as [IS(P) → IQ(P-world)], where P-world mirrors Dohrn’s P-
scenario, then the ramifications for Dohrn’s counterfactual use of imagination attain 
significance for our purposes here in discussing imagination’s modalizing functionality.42 The 
question is, can Dohrn’s counterfactual operation for imagination convincingly distinguish 
♢E♢M(C)P from ♢M(NC)P by, say, an associated robustness of the coherence in the possibility 
case? If not, then we are left with this idea of drawing upon our relevant knowledge about P 
being characterized in an ad hoc way, since the lack of a recognized contradiction can fall apart 
given novel relevant knowledge. 
 Dohrn (2020) grounds the robustness of coherence in the possibility case in two ways, 
via an appeal to actuality and to possibility. For instance, in the actuality case,  
[w]hen the issue is whether a unicorn is possible, a diligent imaginer is aware of additional 
metaphysical requirements coming with unicorns as a purported natural kind. The constraint on 
an imagined unicorn becomes that it belongs to a natural kind. The facts that make for its 
kindhood must be available for being imported into the scenario. This requirement clashes with 
 
42 The imagination described in conceivability views of modality, such as in Kung (2010; 2016), and the 
imagination described in counterfactual views of modality, such as in Dohrn (2020), presumably attain some 
differences. The ‘drawing on relevant knowledge’ condition for IS(P) → IQ(P-world), based on Williamson’s 
(2007) notion of holding fixed “constitutive facts” about P (164), is meant to highlight one such difference. 
However, insofar as our relevant knowledge about P is based on non-modal sources – e.g., appeals to actuality in 
observation or possibility in folk theories (Cf., Morato (2019, 826) for a related account) – then we have a 
conceptual link with Kung’s MEI. In other words, notwithstanding the significant differences between 
conceivability-applied imagination and counterfactual-applied imagination, there are potential ways in conceiving 
of imagination’s counterfactual use that render it applicable to our purposes here. In any case, a more substantial 
treatment of counterfactual-applied imagination’s modalizing functionality must be pursued elsewhere. 
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one’s knowledge that there are no unicorns, hence no facts to be imported. The imaginer 
becomes enmeshed in a dissonance of the right kind (unicorns have their actual deep structure 
vs. there is no actual deep structure) (3648).  
Here, knowledge of actual organisms informs modal claims about those organisms via relevant 
background knowledge of natural kinds. However, when we are dealing with a seemingly non-
extant entity, then there are no actual facts to be imported since we have no knowledge of these 
actual organisms. Notwithstanding, depending on one’s view of natural kinds and species, it is 
not certain that there are no sufficiently similar animals to unicorns for the latter’s metaphysical 
possibility to be validly claimed.43 Thus, not only is the claimed dissonance here not given, but 
any claimed coherence sourced from the importation of actual facts cannot be non-ad hoc, since 
the importation is amenable to one’s changeable views on what constitutes actuality. 
Admittedly, Dohrn ultimately espouses a weakening of this imaginative basing on actuality, 
opting to situate imagination’s modal role around its experimental capacity to engage with 
specific test scenarios. 
For Dohrn (2020),  
[e]specially in the case of rather abstract and theoretical constraints like atom number or 
kindhood, general theoretical knowledge and understanding may not yet be sufficient for 
developing a proper sensitivity for constitutive matters that would lead to cognitive dissonance. 
Rather such a sensitivity will often have to be honed by breaking down the general issue into 
more detailed test scenarios, which enmesh one in more localized and specific experiences of 
dissonance. We may call this the experimental role of imagination (3648).  
In the case of atom number, according to Dohrn, “[t]o ascertain that atom number is essential, 
we might have to play through relevant alternatives like slightly changing the theoretical roles 
of subatomic particles. Imagination is instrumental in creatively developing such relevant 
alternatives.” (3650) These alternatives must furthermore  
be suitable in two respects. They have to be psychologically suitable for tightening our grip on 
the pertinent constraints and triggering relevant dissonance, and they have to be objectively 
suitable in attuning those psychological features to the logical and metaphysical structure of 
modal space. If the right conditions are in place, i.e. we properly understand the question, have 
comprehensive worldly knowledge, have done sufficient imaginative experimenting etc., 
cognitive dissonance should arise precisely if A violates some metaphysical constraint. Often 
 
43 Cf., Note 21. 
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we will need to explore a variety of [alternative] ways for A to be made true, but there is no 
principled reason why these ways have to minimally depart from actuality (3651).  
The significant point here is in these alternatives being ‘objectively suitable in attuning’ our 
awareness of background information about what we are IQ-imagining ‘to the logical and 
metaphysical structure of modal space’. If these objectively suitable alternatives lead to 
contradiction in one’s IQ(P-world), then we cannot validly assert ♢M(NC)P, but if they do not, 
then we can validly assert ♢M(NC)P. 
How do we come to know about this modal space that differentiates ♢E♢M(C)P from 
♢M(NC)P in a way that does not just trivialize said knowledge? In the case of atomic number, 
how do we know that us being constrained by certain roles of subatomic particles that do not 
allow for, say, a not-79-numbered gold (¬79-gold) necessarily precludes future discoverable 
roles that do allow this? If we cannot know this space in an infallible way, then how we 
determine the objective logical and metaphysical structure of modal space must itself be 
fallible, in that the structure can be reconstituted in varying ways. This is because otherwise, if 
the space is constituted by the constraints to which our imaginative development should be 
sensitive, then even the constraints of our imagining ¬79-gold should not change our verdict 
of ♢M(C)(¬79-gold) if we can access them infallibly – our imagination after all would be 
concordant with those infallibly accessed constraints. In other words, the fact that it is not 
certain that further imaginings of alternatives associated with ¬79-gold will not be reconciled 
with the constraints that we have now of 79-gold, a fact that Dohrn (2020) himself seems to 
espouse, (Cf. 3655n) implies that the constraints’ status within modal space is far from given. 
For instance, it is not a priori impossible for there to be an 80-gold with identical 
phenomenological properties as 79-gold. We can then generalize this to any metaphysical 
constraint whatsoever.  
If, however, we can know this modal space infallibly, then it seems that the only feature 
of modal space associated with constraints that we can know for certain, which places specific 
modal verdicts on scenarios, is that of logical identity.44 For any other type of identity relation, 
if we do not want to trivialize our knowledge thereof via stipulation, then we can only know 
them fallibly. All this implies an inevitable reading of Dohrn’s fallible metaphysically modal 
epistemology of imagination in terms of epistemic possibility, for there does not seem to be 
 
44 See the discussion in Section 4. 
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any principled reason why the way in which modal claims are explained as fallible cannot be 
through our lack of infallible epistemic access of constraints that relevantly affect the modal 
status of our imaginings.45  
Now, this is not to say that mere epistemic possibility and epistemic possibility of 
metaphysical possibility are identical notions, just that whatever differentiation there may be 
between ♢E♢M(C)P and ♢EP – e.g., based on their non-modal evidential substantiations – has 
yet to divulge a non-ad hoc corresponding one between ♢E♢M(C)P and ♢M(NC)P. Dohrn’s 
attempt does not allow for it, because if the fallibilism in his modal claims about P are grounded 
on our fallible non-modal intuitions – e.g., relevant background knowledge – about what 
constitutes a P-world, then his modal claims about P are based on what we know as some non-
modal feature of P-world. This is just a reading of modality in terms of what is possible for all 
we know, certainly or not. Dohrn may try to invoke a further condition of imagining relevant 
alternatives as test scenarios, which supposedly are ‘objectively suitable in attuning’ our 
awareness of background information about what we are IQ-imagining ‘to the logical and 
metaphysical structure of modal space’ of our imaginings. Nevertheless, this modally relevant 
objective suitability of imagined alternatives seems best suited for the infallible determination 
of modal claims vis-à-vis apparent contradictions, for only then can our background 
 
45 The closest that Dohrn comes to a non-epistemically informed fallibilism about imagination’s modalizing 
functionality is in his attribution of a logical commitment to a possible-worlds approach to said functionality. For 
Dohrn (2018), “a commitment to the disjunction of p and q is usually weaker than a commitment to p.” (364) In 
terms of a possible-worlds approach to P-worlds and R-worlds, read as P and R respectively, ♢M(NC)(P ∨ R) may 
be an objectively easier claim to make than either ♢M(NC)P or ♢M(NC)R alone, since (P ∨ R) could be true in more 
possible worlds than either P or R taken individually. This may also be the case regardless of our epistemic access 
of such worlds. Nonetheless, there is an issue here, for ♢M(C)P can also be true regardless of what anyone’s 
epistemic state looks like, and it was this consideration that motivated our construction of ♢M(NC)P = ♢E♢M(C)P in 
Section 1. Consequently, a non-epistemic feature in a possible-worlds approach to the truth relation between (P ∨ 
R) and either P or R taken individually can be read as ♢M(C){[(P ∨ R) ⊇ P] ∧ [(P ∨ R) ⊇ R]}, which we have 
already seen does not require an agent-indexed reading. However, insofar as any claim of said relation is read in 
terms of ♢M(NC), then how we derive ♢E♢M(C){[(P ∨ R) ⊇ P] ∧ [(P ∨ R) ⊇ R]} follows what has been discussed 
previously: given the existence of agents, any actual or possible truth will speak to an agent’s epistemic state 
concerning that truth, for what is not infallibly known can be to some degree fallibly known, and what one is 
completely ignorant of still implies a feature of one’s epistemic state. Thus, any fallible claim about ♢M(C){[(P ∨ 
R) ⊇ P] ∧ [(P ∨ R) ⊇ R]} cannot escape an agent-indexed reading in terms of ♢E. 
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information truthfully speak to the modal status of our claims; and even then we are faced with 
readings in terms of ♢E(NC). Otherwise, without apparent contradictions, there really is nothing 
left for our awareness/knowledge of background information to cling on to that guarantees the 
truth of modal claims. All we are thus left with is a fallible grounding of modal claims of P on 
our non-modal knowledge about P, and no amount of imagining of alternatives that does not 
come up against contradiction will certify such grounding. In short, we still have an 
interpretation of modality in terms of what is possible for all we know, certainly or not. 
6. Conclusion 
Let us take stock. Dohrn wants to ground modal claims on imagination’s capacity to 
construct test scenarios, thereby affording the useful importation of relevant background 
information to inform such claims and constrain their non-modal imaginative development. 
However, without a priori assurance that no newly apprehended information will modify what 
we consider significant to this development – e.g., new roles for subatomic particles – then the 
claims themselves are fallible. A fallible non-modal grounding also features in Kung’s account 
of MEI, which lends credence to the argument that such a grounding partly constitutes non-
circular, fallible modal epistemology in general.  
This non-modal fallibility is inevitably expressed as our less than perfect epistemic 
access of the non-modal constraints of imagination’s modalizing function, because without the 
factivity of infallible knowledge, what we find is a fallible inference from one’s epistemic state 
to the veracity of modal claims, even one grounded on complete ignorance. Despite a critique 
of undesirability, without a non-ad hoc distinction between ♢E♢M(C) and ♢M(NC), any evidential 
substantiation of one’s modal claims cannot in principle decide between infallible 
substantiation of epistemic possibility or fallible substantiation of metaphysical possibility, for 
any truth fallibly claimed also infallibly entails some feature of the epistemic state regarding 
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